

- Out of scope
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4. 2024/25 final budget

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[REDACTED]

The Board discussed spending priorities and how those priorities are being assessed in light of the OAG recommendations. Certain competing priorities are being monitored in GE26 planning and continuous improvement initiatives. Staff expertise is being drawn on to assess systems and potential improvements. The Board will be briefed on pressure points and expectations to improve the effectiveness and integrity of the electoral system. The Commission's strategic priorities that are currently being discussed will influence upcoming budget decisions.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

7. Assurance framework update

Kristin Leslie joined the meeting for this item

The Board:

1. **noted** that staff feedback on the draft assurance framework has been reviewed and incorporated into an updated version, plus additional guidance to help staff understand their assurance obligations
2. **approved** the updated assurance framework

Leigh Deuchars and Kristin Leslie outlined staff feedback that informed the updated assurance framework. The SLG considered the framework in April and provided valuable comments on skill uplift on a new process. Kristin described the proposed assurance cycle and high-level expectations it sets.

The Board welcomed the framework and stressed the importance of embedding the function into the organisation through consistent practice. A workplan will be developed to support implementation, which will be informed by assurance reviews currently underway, including implementing the recommendations of the OAG report. PWC are examining controls and the Commission's legal obligations, and Voting Services and Enrolment teams have been responding positively to the discussion.

The Board discussed how staff can understand the importance of the assurance framework, and of open reporting of potential problems or errors. This could be a feature of the strategy session with the Board, which will be organised soon. A timeline with milestones will also be provided.

10/10/2014

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- | Row | Bar Length (approx. % of total width) |
|-----|---------------------------------------|
| 1 | 90 |
| 2 | 95 |
| 3 | 10 |
| 4 | 65 |
| 5 | 98 |
| 6 | 92 |
| 7 | 100 |
| 8 | 72 |
| 9 | 96 |
| 10 | 70 |
| 11 | 90 |
| 12 | 25 |
| 13 | 95 |
| 14 | 98 |
| 15 | 92 |
| 16 | 95 |

Item #: 24.10-03a
Item: Quarterly Risk and Assurance update and Strategic Risk Review
To: Electoral Commission
For: Board meeting, 17 July 2024
Prepared by: Leigh Deuchars, DCE Strategy, Governance and Development
Kristin Leslie, Manager Strategy, Risk and Assurance

Recommendations

It is recommended that the Board:

1. **note** the majority of progress this quarter has occurred in the assurance area
2. **note and discuss** the review of strategic risks that has been completed, including the assessment that little overall change to our risk ratings should be made, but minor changes in the trends of four risks have occurred
3. **note** a review of our strategic risks will commence as part of the August strategy workshops with ELT and the Board
4. **Out of scope**

Purpose

1. This paper provides an update of Risk and Assurance activity and supports the regular review of risk by the Board.

Background

2. The management of risk in the Commission continues to evolve. The Board had in 2023 sought changes in the way that the Commission discusses and reports on risk, and in the pre-Election period conducted deep dives in addition to completing quarterly reviews of the organisational risk profile. Since the election, the Auditor-General's report has driven further work, although a significant part of its focus has been on the results and quality assurance process. The OAG recommendations updates, programme updates, and operational controls and risk landscape updates provided by functions also inform the Board's discussion of the Commission's risk landscape.
3. A verbal update on progress in the Risks and Assurance area was provided at the Board meeting in April. At that meeting, the Board also approved the Assurance Framework be consulted with staff and approved the Assurance plan for the remainder of the 2023/24 year. The Framework was tested with the Senior Leadership Group and was approved by the Board in June.

Progress Update

4. Progress this quarter has been impacted by planned leave and staff illness. Despite this, the following work has progressed:

Assurance

5. The Assurance framework has been published on the intranet and has had a 'soft launch' with SLG. A number of SLG members have voiced the desire to progress work in their own areas, however our ability to support this work remains constrained.
6. Despite this, some teams are making a start at considering the risk and control environment within their teams. Including:
 - Enrolment have documented their understanding of their integrity landscape (item included in this Board meeting).
 - Strategic Partnerships and Engagement are documenting their risk landscape, commencing a top down view of their management controls.
 - PWC have started the controls documentation for enrolment and post-election as it was a necessary input for them to be able to do their analysis which is informing the respective teams.
7. The four audits agreed in April have progressed but are not yet complete. The PWC reports are anticipated to come to the Board in August (enrolment and post-election). The timeline for Deloitte reports on third party risk and prioritisation of activity in our supply chain is currently under review.
8. Our OAG sector manager has been in regular contact and sought meetings in the last month on updates and progress.

Risk review


9. The Board last considered the Strategic Risks in February 2024. At that time the risk profile was separated into strategic system risks and operational risks and two new risks added; *'The Commission fails to ensure the Public have confidence in its role as system administrator'* (strategic risk) and *'Being unable to demonstrate our processes manage risk well, and the efficacy of our controls'* (operational risk).
10. The Strategic Risk framework is attached to this paper as **Appendix A**. ELT reviewed and discussed the framework on 14 May. The attached profile reflects that discussion and other factors that have subsequently emerged. Some changes have been made to the detailed slides behind the summary to update the mitigations. These are in red text.

Out of scope


Changes in risk ratings between quarters:

- 13. There has been little change in our overall risk ratings. This is not unexpected as the strategic risks by their nature are of high impact to the Commission and are complex in nature and therefore, hard to shift.
- 14. The trend of some risks has changed slightly. This is outlined below.

Upward trend




Downward trend



- 18. *Being unable to demonstrate our processes manage risk well, and the efficacy of our controls:* The progress of Audits on Post-election and Enrolment are providing clear recommendations that if implemented, will improve our capacity in these areas.

Next steps



Appendix: July 2024 Board and ELT risk profile

Summary of action

Strategic system risk – failure to achieve strategic outcomes for the system

ID	Risk	Summary of current risk level/ action underway	Rating	Trend	Last modified
■	Out of scope	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	→	[REDACTED]
■	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	→	[REDACTED]
■	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	→	[REDACTED]
■	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	→	[REDACTED]
■	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	→	[REDACTED]
15	Commission fails to ensure the Public have confidence in its role as system administrator– strategic risk	Out of scope [REDACTED] Improvements need to fully address risk findings from OAG and lessons learned and be transparently reported on.	[REDACTED]	→	[REDACTED]

Operational risk – risks that the Commission will struggle to meet its deliverables, or to deliver optimally					
ID	Risk	Summary of current risk level/ action underway	Rating	Trend	modified
1	Out of scope	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	➡	[REDACTED]
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
2	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	➡	[REDACTED]
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
3	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	➡	[REDACTED]
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
4	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	➡	[REDACTED]
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
5	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	➡	[REDACTED]
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
6	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	➡	[REDACTED]
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
7	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	➡	[REDACTED]
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
8	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	➡	[REDACTED]
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
9	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	➡	[REDACTED]
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
10	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	➡	[REDACTED]
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
11	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	➡	[REDACTED]
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
12	Over-reliance on core staff results in critical points of failure	Lessons learned and other activities to review our performance completed. These, the OAG review and other audits, are prompting reviews for critical points of failure and processes and activity documented which should reduce this risk. Activities to mitigate this risk are likely to be reviewed and structured into a programme of work shortly.	[REDACTED]	➡	[REDACTED]
13	Out of scope	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	➡	[REDACTED]
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
		[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
14	Being unable to demonstrate our processes manage risk well, and the efficacy of our controls	OAG report shows we cannot demonstrate this for key processes. We need to design, assure our design, and run our processes and build appropriate assurance and monitoring of assurance into all key processes. We have been assessing key processes for efficacy of risk management; efficacy of our system of controls and efficacy of governance of these risks both in workstreams, and via audits. Risk still high until can demonstrate the assurance is there and appropriate performance monitoring. Currently capacity gaps require resolution.	[REDACTED]	➡	[REDACTED]

1. Loss of trust in the electoral system

IN CONFIDENCE

Out of scope	[Redacted]	
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
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	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
Further mitigations	[Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] - Transparent reporting on progress on OAG recs.	
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	
[Redacted]		
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
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[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]

12. Over-reliance on core staff results in critical points of failure

Out of scope		

	Current state
	OAG has highlighted that over reliance on key staff and lack of appropriate processes, documentation collate into likely failure points. This risk is to be considered in conjunction with risk 14. Re staff pressure, the approach to workstreams for GE 26 has decreased siloed approach and increased shared understanding however, this also puts pressure on key SME capacity

14. Being unable to demonstrate our processes manage risk well, and demonstrate the efficacy of our controls

Out of scope		

Current state
OAG report shows we cannot demonstrate this for key processes. Work is commencing to assess key processes. Significant work required in the coming cycle to assess, redesign our processes incorporating assurance, controls and oversight into their design. Capacity and capability is currently a challenge.

15. Commission fails to ensure the Public have confidence in its role as system administrator– strategic risk

Out of scope	
	Commission has committed to sharing the progress on OAG recs. These aren't presently in a state to share.
Current state	
	Commission has committed to sharing the progress on OAG recs. These aren't presently in a state to share.

Item #: 24.10-03b

Item: **OAG Recommendations – update on progress and next steps**

To: Electoral Commission

For: Board meeting 17 July 2024

Prepared by: Leigh Deuchars, DCE Strategy, Governance and Development
Kristin Leslie, Manager Strategy, Risk and Assurance

Recommendations

It is recommended that the Board:

1. **note** the seven recommendations of the OAG report on its independent review of GE23 counting errors, released on 7 May 2024, address complex challenges, and completing the actions in response to the report are full electoral term work programmes
2. **note** several streams of activities will be combined to inform a more detailed workplan (informed by risk) in the coming month
3. **note** that good progress has been made on mapping key processes, however, ELT needs to consider ways to mitigate capacity and capability gaps to continue to remove constraints on progress
4. **discuss** the proposed reporting approach proposed in Appendix 1.

Purpose

1. This paper updates the Board on progress related to the Auditor-General's report's recommendations; highlights some areas of challenge and the recommended next steps.

Background

2. The Auditor-General tabled his report in Parliament in May 2024, and the Board has indicated its full commitment to implementing the report's recommendations. The Board has previously been updated on immediate activities undertaken to respond to recommendations and advice, including for the Port Waikato by-election; it has also commissioned further advice to address risks identified and enable effective improvements (the PWC post-election and enrolment 2024 design audits underway). This is the first holistic report on the Commission's progress implementing the Auditor-General's recommendations .

Discussion

Overview of work underway

3. The OAG report's seven recommendations address complex challenges, and completing the actions in response to the report are full electoral term work programmes. The recommendations require substantial assessment and redesign of processes as well as resulting changes in people's skills and focus, training design, technology changes, and lifting our level of risk management, assurance, monitoring and oversight capability.

4. In the coming month three areas of work will be brought together to refine the current and planned activity to best focus effort. These include:
 - Actions in the priority workstreams of the GE26 programme. All recommendations are currently assigned across workstreams to consider in their scoping.
 - An assessment of the planned actions and their ability to achieve the outcomes sought by the recommendations. This will identify any misalignment in actions as well as unidentified capability and capacity gaps that might prevent successful change.
 - The findings of the PWC post-election and enrolment design audits that are nearing completion. These audits will provide a clear outline of what level of risk can be mitigated in these areas and the level and type of controls required.
5. The outcomes of this work will be reported to the Board in August alongside the PWC audit findings.
6. Several key pieces of work have progressed while the above work has been underway. An assessment of the work completed and in progress is attached as Appendix A. In summary:
 - Initial high-level process maps have been completed for the enrolment and post-election areas
 - High level documentation of current controls in enrolment and post-election areas has been completed
 - Scoping of by-election readiness has been completed and actions will be monitored by the Programme Management Office (PMO).
7. Work progressing or commencing includes:
 - PWC analysis will highlight risk areas and recommend options for priority improvements (report due August)
 - Scoping and discovery of short- and longer-term solutions to issues occurring in workstreams (programme briefs August/September)
 - PMO and Risk and Assurance are starting work to design a proposed approach to ensure quality management (oversight for necessary tasks and controls) are delivered in the programme.
 - The CIO is completing a current state assessment of our IT systems that will support the Commission to make informed choices about current and future technology options.


Risks and challenges

8. Commission staff are all clearly keen to ensure that the problems that previously arose will be managed, and that any potential issues are addressed.
9. There are some capacity and capability constraints that ELT needs to address to support staff to make the required changes. With respect to the OAG recommendations, the current pressure points are in process mapping and redesign and risk and assurance (noting that the capacity of SMEs to do this work is minimal):
 - *Process mapping and redesign:* The majority of the recommendations require Business Analysis (BA) skill to map current processes (particularly with an understanding of mapping controls), a consistent methodology or tool to use and, once mapped, further Business Analysis and service design skill to redesign existing processes. Our existing SMEs and BAs have identified the need but require more capacity and capability to manage the volume of work.

- *Risk, assurance and quality management*: this is also a capacity issue. There is a high desire for support and development from workstreams and teams to identify and revise their risk and control management. However, capacity to meet demand while responding to the range of organisational need is hampering progress. Capacity is also hampering development of an Enterprise risk management framework.
- These gaps exist at the ‘enterprise’ level as well as in teams. ELT will consider the most effective balance of support across the respective operational teams to support option development (we have a small number of SMEs who are already thinly spread) and at the cross-organisation level.

10. Other capability and capacity gaps will likely emerge as the work to address the recommendations progresses. These will need to be mapped against the requirements of the broader GE programme and the Commission business plans.

Next steps and Phasing



Appendices

Appendix 1: Summary of progress on recommendations

Note: The order of the recommendations have been changed to capture overarching recommendations (risk management and process documentation) before addressing detailed recommendations.

Recommendation	Underlying recommendations or advice	What has happened so far	What is happening now?	Reasonableness review- Note this will be included in future reports once the more detailed workstreams are underway as per 'next steps' in para 7 of this paper.
R3 Complete the end-to-end description of the election process and inter-dependencies of activities, and identify controls that support the election process	Part 4: The errors and why they happened — Office of the Auditor-General New Zealand (oag.parliament.nz) [4.48] Extend mapping of the end-to-end process to include identifying automated and manual controls that manage risks in the processes, and testing these for effectiveness. [5.30] Have complete documentation of the associated controls the Commission will use to ensure that these risks are well managed (interdependency R7)	- An initial end to end process map of Election processes has been completed, note this does not yet include all automated and manual controls that manage risk in the processes. - Process maps have contributed to increased understanding in the work underway.	Some documentation of controls underway in connection to the enrolment and post-election workstreams; with the support of PWC. (These will then need to be overlaid onto the end-to-end election process maps). Strong interdependency with the discovery and design work being undertaken in the programme workstreams, where in some workstreams process maps are being helpfully used and challenged to understand interdependencies. (Further work in this area to be completed as the priorities and approaches are finalised in coming months.)	Overall assessment: Factors 1. Volume of progress 2. Interdependency 3. Capability or Capacity Constraints 4. Impact on ability to get to anticipated later milestones 5. Other
Rec 7 Enhance risk identification processes and continue to apply programme and project management disciplines (including managing risks) throughout the election period	Part 5: The Electoral Commission's approach to managing election risks — Office of the Auditor-General New Zealand (oag.parliament.nz) [5.30] Conduct a holistic assessment of all sources of risk to the integrity of the election (external AND internal) [5.30] Have complete documentation of the associated controls the Commission will use to ensure that these risks are well managed (interdependency R3) Implied recommendations: [5.15] Implement regular risk workshops with key programme / project stakeholders [5.27] Ensure formal risk and issue management continues throughout the process [in GE23 this ceased when GE Taskforce initiated] [5.28] Have a risk culture that supports raising and escalating risks, and realistic assessment of the likelihood and/or impact of risks.	- Assurance framework has been adopted which increases clarity on the roles and responsibilities that will be put in place and how those risks will occur. - The quarter 4 FY24 risk update has been completed which resets the understanding of holistic assessment of risk from a Strategic perspective.	Workstreams have been identifying pain points in processes and covering a range of risks in their conversations. This has been impacted by lack of capacity to provide support. Some functions are also identifying the risks they need to address and how to document their “baseline risk and assurance” for assessment. (eg Enrolment have done a “landscape” to identify what they do, which is a step towards being able to do an assessment of risk; and Strategic Engagement and Partnerships have made a good start on documenting their key risks, and the preventative control and management control activities which help them manage those issues.) Quality management approach has been signalled for discussion in Programme Board, with parameters of approach and work requirements to be defined for the post-election period and activities within it.	
R1 Review all vote counting and quality assurance checks and controls to address gaps and vulnerabilities	Part 4: The errors and why they happened — Office of the Auditor-General New Zealand (oag.parliament.nz) Paras 4.37 – 4.74 [4.37] Processes need to be standardised with detailed but clear standard operating procedures.	- Development of assurance policy and FY23-24 audit plan items which relate to OAG report [precursor] - Approved changes for by-elections and readiness for	Audit by PWC of system of processes and controls for vote counts commissioned, and almost complete. Quality management approach is being explored, with parameters of approach and work requirements to be defined for the post-election period and activities within it.	

Recommendation	Underlying recommendations or advice	What has happened so far	What is happening now?	Reasonableness review- Note this will be included in future reports once the more detailed workstreams are underway as per 'next steps' in para 7 of this paper.
	• [4.37] Process implementation and resulting error rates need to be monitored to ensure that processes are consistently followed and quality is not compromised. • [4.38] Need more effective processes to ensure that tasks are completed as expected. • [4.38] Need more supporting guidance for tasks, especially those that are complex or rely on judgement. • [4.39] Continue to separate key activities such as data entry and data entry checking, have different count teams at voting places and electorate headquarters, and continue "one-up reviews" for key tasks. • [4.39] Implement accountability measures to provide evidence that tasks have been completed (either workflow approval or documented evidence). • [4.39] Consider double-entry of data, followed by a check (manual or automated) to provide additional assurance. • [4.40] Consider use of technology for data validation. (cross reference to R6 -review information technology) • [4.41] Consider whether technology (with appropriate security controls) could provide additional robustness to the manual vote counting process. (cross reference to R6 -review information technology) • [4.42] Consider technology-enabled controls to support complex manual tasks and reduce errors. (cross reference to R6 -review information technology) • [4.44] Explore enhancing EMS to make it easier to identify more obvious errors. (cross reference to R6 -review information technology) • [4.45] Analyse errors, identify gaps or vulnerabilities in systems, processes, and controls, and prepare an improvement plan to address them before the next election. • [4.49] Have a formal process to provide the executive leadership team and the Electoral Commission Board with assurance that all exceptions identified are either below the error tolerance or have been resolved. • [4.107] Carefully review resourcing to ensure that enrolment and post-election work can be completed in a timely way and avoid pressure	byelection work has been considered at programme board, (note mitigations and level of risk will need to be reviewed and updated pending the PWC report.) • The high-level documentation of reporting needs (use cases) for monitoring dashboards to support risk management and operational visibility of key tasks is complete.	Workstreams (predominantly for this rec, post-election, enrolment, and the Support for Election Delivery workforce (training); temporary workforce (resourcing) workstreams) are aware of the areas from the OAG recs that they need to address in their workplans with further testing to occur at Programme Board. The CIO is progressing a current state assessment of our existing systems as a baseline to size and scope future development plans.	

Recommendation	Underlying recommendations or advice	What has happened so far	What is happening now?	Reasonableness review- Note this will be included in future reports once the more detailed workstreams are underway as per 'next steps' in para 7 of this paper.
	on the later processes that are safeguards to providing a correct official count.(cross reference to review resourcing – some improvements to help this may be process, some may be resourcing)			
R2 Review and update standard operations manuals and instructions, to improve the clarity of information about quality control activities and why they are important and to clarify accountability and responsibility for carrying them out	Part 4: The errors and why they happened — Office of the Auditor-General New Zealand (oag.parliament.nz) Paras 4.76 – 4.81 [4.77] Ensure National Office has its own processes for the vote count fully documented and these are kept up to date and fit for purpose. [4.78] Produce and provide detailed but clear operating manuals and ensure that individuals understand what they need to do, who they are accountable to, and what they are responsible for, including responsibility for quality assurance checks. [4.79] Consider whether improvements could be made to the language and format of existing manuals that are used by a largely temporary workforce with considerable variation in educational and work backgrounds. [4.79] Consider consolidating and making the materials available digitally for voting places and electorate headquarters. [4.80] Continuously reinforce why people are being asked to do certain tasks, through training, manuals, and briefings. Ensure they better understand the potential impact on the integrity of the count if tasks are not carried out. [4.90] Give particular thought to the adequacy of training on post-election processes. Provide people in key roles with sufficient, targeted, and timely training to ensure that they have the knowledge to fulfil their role. Reinforce key messages, such as accuracy over speed.	4.77 – Status Quo process manual for national office is updated for post-election. Note: these are activities that will largely occur later in the cycle as they rely on process documentation and design to be completed	The support for election delivery workforce stream is underway and is looking at 4.78-4.90).	
R4 Review the personnel requirements for elections, the process for recruiting and training election workers, and planning for contingencies	Part 4: The errors and why they happened — Office of the Auditor-General New Zealand (oag.parliament.nz) Paras 4.91 to 4.107 [4.92] Need more comprehensive process for monitoring how recruitment is progressing. [4.102] Consider the timing of recruitment for post-election managers and official count process leads. Electorate managers should receive guidance about the skills required for		Temporary workforce priority workstream is presently looking at all of these activities. Health, Safety, Wellbeing and Security Lead role is being recruited to help support work and to address HSW needs across workstreams. Additional and separate resourcing needs for different workstream resourcing are underway in a number of	

Recommendation	Underlying recommendations or advice	What has happened so far	What is happening now?	Reasonableness review- Note this will be included in future reports once the more detailed workstreams are underway as per 'next steps' in para 7 of this paper.
(such as staff unavailability, system outages, and fatigue)	these roles which differ from pre-election and election day work. [4.105] Carefully manage staff fatigue, particularly in the post-election period, as a significant operational risk. [4.105] Give specific consideration to rostering to ensure that staff responsible for final count and quality assurance checks are adequately rested. This might require building in additional resource and quality assurance for the post-election period. [4.106] Have contingency plans that enable electorates and the National Office to "scale up" quickly, cover absences or staff shortages, and manage fatigue over an extended election period. [4.107] Carefully review resourcing to ensure that enrolment and post-election work can be completed in a timely way and avoid pressure on the later processes that are safeguards to providing a correct official count.(cross reference to post election process design)		workstreams; in co-ordination with the temporary workforce workstream.	
R5 Review hardware requirements, to ensure that electorates have sufficient technology to complete tasks required of them	Part 4: The errors and why they happened — Office of the Auditor-General New Zealand (oag.parliament.nz) Paras 4.108 – 4.109 4.108 – sufficient number of laptops and technology in place in the field to enable effective working practices (paraphrased) 4.109 – onboarding process for hardware and software access efficiently and effectively gives those who need access the appropriate resources.		Provision of laptops is being reviewed by the Temporary election workforce workstream which is also looking at onboarding requirements. Hardware requirements across temporary accommodation is also being addressed.	
R6 Review the information technology systems that support the election process to ensure that they remain fit for purpose for both electorate and National Office functions	Part 4: The errors and why they happened — Office of the Auditor-General New Zealand (oag.parliament.nz) Paras 4.110 – 4.113 [4.111] Make improvements to information technology systems to better manage material handling, particularly ballot boxes. [4.113] Consider information technology as part of assessing organisational and election risks [4.113] Consider potential security risks associated with how the various systems, including the online recruitment system, are configured. Plus		Workstreams are considering the use of technology to make improvements (logistics, post-election, enrolment, etc.) IT have been working with our 3rd parties improve understanding of the capacity we have for improvements, which, alongside our assessment of current systems, will inform our understanding of the scope and scale of the work to be done.	

Recommendation	Underlying recommendations or advice	What has happened so far	What is happening now?	Reasonableness review- Note this will be included in future reports once the more detailed workstreams are underway as per ‘next steps’ in para 7 of this paper.
	• [4.40] Consider use of technology for data validation. (cross reference to R1 -review processes, QA and contorls) • [4.41] Consider whether technology (with appropriate security controls) could provide additional robustness to the manual vote counting process. (cross reference to R1 -review processes, QA and contorls) • [4.42] Consider technology-enabled controls to support complex manual tasks and reduce errors. (cross reference to R1 -review processes, QA and contorls) [4.44] Explore enhancing EMS to make it easier to identify more obvious errors. (cross reference to R1 -review processes, QA and contorls)			

Out of scope

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Leigh Deuchars & Kristin Leslie joined the meeting

1. **noted** a verbal update on recent progress towards implementing the recommendations made by the Office of the Auditor-General and consultants PWC
2. **noted** that a report will be prepared and shared with the Board shortly summarising the Commission's proposed responses to the recommendations, which will in turn inform advice to the Minister of Justice

Leigh Deuchars and Kristin Leslie provided a verbal update on recent progress addressing the quality assurance improvements recommended by the Office of the Auditor-General and PWC. Work across a range of Commission policy development processes has incorporated responses to the two sets of recommendations. The team has also been working to develop a 'minimum viable product' that incorporates quality assurance improvements into a service level model for GE26 and beyond, within available resources. The SGD team has been incorporating significant provisions to strengthen quality assurance checks into the performance plan, in direct response to the recommendations.

Current actions and resource allocations have been examined for gaps, in a complex and rapidly evolving process. Some long-term challenges identified in PWC's report are not yet fully addressed, such as legislative changes (including automatic enrolment updates, and technological investment). Broad areas for improvement that are being scoped can mostly be addressed. Other outstanding issues include the time required to design and implement improvements, which is particularly limited by IT staff availability, and risks within current baseline funding to keeping rolls updated between elections. Targeted resourcing will permit some capability building within the Commission, but substantial improvements are not currently affordable.

Ms Deuchars invited the Board to consider a high-level management response to the PWC report recommendations – this will be prepared in the next few weeks, and will inform advice to the Minister of Justice. The paper will be circulated out of session. The report will seek to outline proposals that can be implemented within baseline, alongside areas that might be implemented if more funding was available. Detailed management planning will depend on further design work and resourcing decisions yet to be taken.

One area in which the Commission's controls need to improve is managing enrolment and post-election processes. The enrolment workstream has identified a plan to implement greater quality control processes, such as improving the completeness of quality assurance checks on enrolment processes. This includes additional steps to implement new roll cleanses and produce timely and visible updates on those cleanses. The processes will identify potential anomalies and external audits of roll integrity, the latter of which haven't been conducted since 2016. A high-level management plan will be developed.

The enrolment quality assurance step during the post-election process is another example of potential initiatives to address recommendations. Completing enrolment work within required timeframes would require about twice the number of assigned staff in GE26, when compared to GE23 staffing.

The Board discussed the advice that will be prepared, and will welcome advice on how the main PWC recommendations will be implemented, and any trade-offs that might be required to resource them. A clear timeline of next steps will be included.

Action: Provide a high-level management response to the PWC recommendations, out of cycle if required, including options and improvement priorities.

■ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]	
■	[REDACTED]
■	[REDACTED]
■	[REDACTED] Out of scope
■	[REDACTED]

8. OAG/PWC recommendations status update

Leigh Deuchars joined the meeting

The Board:

1. **noted** a verbal update on recent progress towards implementing the recommendations made by the Office of the Auditor-General and consultants PWC

Leigh Deuchars provided a verbal update on recent progress addressing the quality assurance improvements recommended by the Office of the Auditor-General and PWC. An initial set of improvements (considered a proxy to enable costings to be developed) shared with the Board previously has led to work on appropriate governance mechanisms to provide strong oversight of the final improvements to risk management and quality assurance of critical processes. The governance mechanism would also ensure skill uplift continues and has adequate support as work becomes busier in the leadup to GE26. A small group will be established to advise ELT on quality assurance, and in turn the Board. Progress will be measured in priority areas, including monitoring of implementation against planned achievements. Potentially an external participant could be invited to the governance group to add valuable outside perspectives.

The Board noted the importance of implementing the recommendations in good time before GE26 to ensure the count errors that occurred at GE23 do not recur. The Justice Committee will likely discuss implementation at our 3 December annual review hearing.

The Board discussed how the Commission is gaining a clearer understanding of its supply chains and how monitoring and control systems influence accuracy and efficiency. The Board will continue to receive updates on progress.

9. November 2024 risk update

The Board:

1. **noted** the update on risk and assurance activities in the Commission
2. **considered** the strategic risk profile of the Commission

Leigh Deuchars, on behalf of Kristin Leslie, gave an overview of the Commission's current risk appraisal and related risk mitigations. Certain levels of uncertainty around funding levels and planning processes are well documented, and the reliance on key staff remains a concern.

The Board discussed the additional risk management resources being obtained to build the Commission's risk management maturity. While the present risk profile is not satisfactory, work is underway to address risk in key workstreams and build stronger controls, capability and governance. Post-election processes will be a key focus. Greater business analyst resources within the Commission is also helping to build organisational risk management maturity.

Out of scope

Auditor-General's report

- Implementing the Auditor-General's recommendations is a priority for us
- These are operational changes and will be put in place as we plan, design and test processes for the election.

After the release of official results of the 2023 General Election on 3 November, the Commission identified a small number of errors that required the results to be amended.

Although these errors did not change the results, they were concerning. After discussion with us, the Auditor-General provided a thorough review of our quality assurance processes.

Progress has been made on implementing the Auditor-General's recommendations. They have been set as a priority in our work programme for the 2026 election.

The recommendations are operational and will be implemented as we plan, design and test processes for the election.

We had short-term improvements in place in case we have a by-election.

We've had external audits of our enrolment and post election processes, which are still being finalised.

We have been going through all our processes reassessing where the risks are, where there are gaps and where we can make improvements. We've also been identifying areas where we can make efficiencies and take complexity out.

Once all the legislative changes likely to come out the Electoral Amendment Bill are clear we will finalise our documentation, controls and training for staff. We've done a thorough amount of work but there are more steps we need to take. We have a plan to do that before the 2026 election.

Example – enrolment – we've identified that there are enrolment updates, for example occupation or honorific changes, that don't affect a person's vote. We are looking at whether we can leave those updates until after the election and focus on the ones that do affect people's vote, for example new enrolments and address changes that put people in another electorate.

Example – the count – we had some data entry errors that weren't picked up. We are looking at building in systems controls and alerts to improve quality control, and to improve our system at the point of data entry including instructions to staff, training and monitoring. These are the things we're looking at. There is more detailed design work to be done and there are costs involved.

Out of scope

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Item: Post-election Workstream – ‘Package A’ decision making on controls

To: Mark Lawson, Chief Electoral Advisor
Martin Rodgers, Director, Voting Services

Prepared by: Rob s9(2)(a) Senior Project Leader
Adele s9(2)(a) Principal Advisor Voting Services

Recommendations

It is recommended that you:

1. Confirm that the information provided in this document reflects decisions made in relation to the design of new and enhanced controls for the preliminary and official counts.
2. Note that the controls considered relates to work the GE2026 Programme Board agreed to progress within ‘Package A’ for the Post-election Priority Workstream.
3. Agree that this paper is referenced in the Status Report to be given to the Programme Board in February.
4. Note that this paper only covers controls relating to the Elections Management System (EMS). Controls relating to the Electronic Roll Scrutiny Application (ERSA) will be considered in a separate paper.
5. Note that considerations relating to audit logging will also be considered in a separate paper.
6. Note that 21 stories have been developed for the Catalyst analysis backlog, for these to be sized prior to the start of development in the current quarter (January-March 2025).
7. Note that during development, further guidance may be sought if questions arise.
8. Note that once developed, the controls will be tested in a ‘life like’ environment to test their effectiveness.
9. Note that, in addition to the above-mentioned papers on ERSA and audit logging, the following papers will also be developed for the Programme Board’s decision-making:
 - Package B – including considerations of how the count is undertaken
 - Where final responsibility and accountability should sit for various activities
 - Other initiatives relating to the management of the post-election period.

Background

10. In September 2024 the Programme Board agreed that within the Post-election Priority Workstream work could progress on “time-critical, ‘must haves’, focused on designing known critical systems changes, with a view to commencing development within Tranche 1 [of the GE2026 Work Programme]”. This was understood to be work required under ‘Package A’.
11. Work on Package A has progressed since September, particularly focused on developing new controls and improving current ones in the Commission’s Elections Management System (EMS). Initial consideration has also been given to the controls within the Electronic Roll Scrutiny Application (ERSA), but due to front-end end-of-life issues and the known complexity of that system, these will be considered in a separate paper.

12. On Tuesday 17 December 2024 a meeting was held between Mark Lawson (Chief Electoral Advisor), Martin Rodgers (Director Voting Services), Rob **s9(2)(a)** (Senior Project Leader) and Adele **s9(2)(a)** (Principal Advisor Voting Services) with the purpose of finalising the approach for designing the controls identified as part of Package A.
13. The purpose of this paper is to document the assumptions agreed to within that meeting for the design of the new and enhanced controls included in Package A.

Discussion

OAG and PwC Reports

14. The content of this paper relates to the Office of the Auditor General's (OAG) recommendation that the Commission 'review all vote counting and quality assurance checks and controls to address gaps and vulnerabilities' (recommendation 1).
15. The OAG specifically observed that changes could be made to improve controls by:
- Ensuring the right information is accessible in the right format and that systems are user-friendly and easy to navigate, and/or have built in data validation (paragraph 4.43).
 - Making it easier to identify more obvious errors, such as when duplicate results are entered for election day and advance voting (paragraph 4.44).
 - Supporting the process with "accountability measures to provide evidence that tasks have been completed (either workflow approval or documented evidence)" (paragraph 4.39).
 - Building a formal process to provide the executive leadership team and the Electoral Commission Board with assurance that all exceptions identified are either below the error tolerance or have been resolved (paragraph 4.49)
16. This paper also relates to PwC's recommendation in its internal audit report that the Commission address 'oversight, detect and mitigate impact control gaps' to:
- Make it easier to detect errors at points where they are more likely (overall recommendation 6)
 - Ensure Official Count results cannot be directly overwritten in EMS with no ability to track changes, or reconcile back to corrections or approvals (overall recommendation 8).
17. Some of the control changes included in this document are also being made to increase the effectiveness of the current set of controls, as they were identified and documented by PwC ([Electoral Commission - Post Election Controls 24-11-05.xlsx](#)).
18. Although supported by technology, many of the Commission's results-related controls are heavily reliant on staff manually completing a set of reasonably complex tasks. Such an approach is open those controls either not being completed at all or as expected, significantly reducing the likelihood that they will be effective.

Initiatives

19. The following sections outline a suite of controls-related changes to be made in EMS. The diagram provided in Appendix 1 compares the current flow of activities with what the flow will look like once these changes are made.

Official Count Issues Management Function

Identified issue

20. The Commission uses the current suite of reports to identify issues with the official count:

- Vote Checking Report
- Election Night and Official Count (EN and OC) Comparison Report
- Electorate Detail Report
- Official Count Progress Report

21. Key issues with these reports are that they:

- Can be difficult to interpret. The reason why an issue is identified is not always readily apparent and issues relating to a single count can be spread over more than one report
- There is currently no process or audit trail showing if an issue has been investigated and resolved.

Aim and description

22. A new issues management function is proposed to provide Electorate Managers with a list of all identified issues, why the issue has been identified and provide them with a location to manage and detail actions taken to resolve identified issues.

23. This management function will also serve to provide National Office with:

- An electorate and nationwide view of the number of issues identified and the progress towards resolving them
- Assurance that issues are being managed and resolved.

24. This initiative aims to directly address the OAG's and PwC's concerns that:

- It needs to be easier to detect issues
- Technology needs to be more user-friendly
- Assurance needs to be obtained that all issues have been identified and appropriately resolved.

25. The function will consist of a table of issues, with links to the affected result-set, an ability to record notes and sign-off the issue as resolved. A mock-up of the table is provided in Appendix 2.

26. The following issues will be captured in the management table:

Issue	Comment
Party total is greater than total issued ballot papers	This will also continue to be captured as an 'error' on the data entry screen in EMS
Candidate total differs from Party total	This will also continue to be captured as an 'error' on the data entry screen in EMS
Party total is less than total issued ballot papers – i.e. the result includes ballot papers issued and not returned	This will continue to be captured on the data entry screen in EMS – but will be included in this report to ensure the number is checked for reasonableness (thresholds for what is reasonable will be detailed in the Operations Manual. This functionality is deemed too difficult to comprehensively build into EMS).
The result-set is an exact duplicate of another results set	• This is done only within electorates, as candidates differ between electorates. • This does not include 'near misses', which will be made more visible through improvements to the Electorate Detail Report (Such functionality is deemed too difficult to comprehensively build into EMS).

Issue	Comment
The total issued ballot papers does not match the corresponding preliminary count.	This will exclude special vote counts and counts with fewer than six ballot papers issued as these are only counted once (noting that options to address this will be included in a further report looking into count and results entry processes).
Individual party counts do not match the corresponding preliminary count	Currently captured in the 'EN and OC Comparison' Report
Individual candidate counts do not match the corresponding preliminary count	Currently captured in the 'EN and OC Comparison' Report

27. The following issues will **not** be captured in the management table:

Issue	Comment
Unexpected distribution of party and/or candidate votes.	This is considered both hard to define and train, which why the 'Vote Checking Report' is currently only made available to NO and not to Electorate Managers.
Party and/or candidate totals do not match the preliminary count.	This is covered by 'Total Issued Ballot Papers' (TIBP) not matching the preliminary count and party and candidate balance against TIBP.
Comparison of TIBP with 'Actual votes'	This is because: 'Actual Votes' data quality can be poor 'Actual Votes' data can only be compared at voting place level, not at count phase level, complicating identification - The comparison is not possible for special votes
Comparison of Special Vote Tracking numbers and special vote counts	This is because: - Data quality can be poor - The changing number of SV phases would make this very complicated.
Compare roll marks and special vote entries made in ERSA with the results	This is due to the high amount of effort this would take, noting it becomes easier if/when scrutiny is integrated into EMS.

28. The issues management function will be developed so that:

- System permissions will be configured to restrict the ability to add a comment and/or sign-off acceptance of an issue to the appropriate role (note: a paper discussing accountabilities and responsibilities around official results will be provided to the Programme Board for consideration).
- Live and resolved issues will be displayed as follows:
 - 'red' issues will be listed first (where results data must be changed to resolve the issue), then 'yellow' issues (where the data may be correct, so might not need to be changed), then resolved issues
 - within each of the above brackets, Māori electorate counts will be listed first, then counts for votes issued by shared electorates, then home electorate counts

- It will be possible to group counts by both location (home General electorate, home Māori electorate, Overseas) and by electorate
- Data will be available to Te Kauhanganaro
- Information will be produced via as a CSV report, which allows data to be manipulated (sorted and filtered) in Excel
- Electorate and nationwide reports will summarise the types of issues identified and numbers with open and resolved statuses

29. In relation to other initiatives also considered in this paper:

- Issues will show up on the voting place (phase) count certificate if they are unresolved
- It will not be possible to print and sign off “final” voting place or electorate-level results certificate if there are outstanding issues.

Further assumptions

30. An Issues Management function will also be built for the Centralised Processing Team (CPT). This will require further analysis prior to being developed.

31. A similar function will **not** be developed for the preliminary count. This is because many of the issues identified on election night can only be fixed once the materials are returned to the HQ and/or where there is time to methodically unpick the count (and often its reconciliation). This is seen as a key purpose of the official count which is completed during the post-election period. Providing all of the identified issues in such a report could cause delays to the timely completion of the preliminary count.

Improving Reasonableness Checks

Identified issue

32. The current suite of reasonableness checking reports (see section 20 above) do not make it easy to detect issues and easily understand them. This was an issue acknowledged in both the OAG and PwC reports.

33. Specific issues relate to:

- Reports being built from the perspective of the electorate the votes are taken for, rather than the electorate (including overseas) entering them
- It being particularly difficult to determine issues with Māori electorate counts, due to the small size of many those counts and the high number of entries in the reports (e.g. one of the Te Tai Tonga electorate reports contained over 1,000 lines of data)
- Overseas not having bespoke reports to check the entry of their data (this relates to the first bullet point above)
- It being difficult to pick up issues with special vote counts, as no comparator data is available.

34. The key principle driving changes in this area is that the office (e.g. electorate or CPT) responsible for entering the information also has a responsibility to ensure it is correct (noting that final accountability will still rest with the electorate the votes are for).

Aim and description

35. The below table provides a list of the proposed new reports and enhancements to existing reports.

Report	Status	Comment
Māori/Shared electorate detail report	New	- This is an election night report showing results for Māori and shared electorates for which the user's electorate is responsible. - The purpose of this report is to allow EMs responsible for entering results for other electorates to conduct reasonableness checks on results their teams have entered.
Māori Electorate Detail report	New	- This is an official count report showing results for Māori electorates for which the user's electorate is responsible. - The purpose of this report is to allow EMs responsible for entering results for other electorates to conduct reasonableness checks on results their teams have entered.
Electorate Detail report (Election Night)	Enhancement	- Ability to filter the user's electorate's counts by the electorate responsible for those counts. - The purpose of this function is to enable EMs to see and conduct reasonableness checks separately on results for their electorate collected by each contributing electorate. - This will enable EMs to see which contributors have and haven't completed their counts and separately compare counts from similar sources (including considering only those counts conducted within their own electorate). - This is expected to be of particular use to Māori electorates, but will also allow general electorate EMs to consider home and shared electorate voting place votes separately.
Electorate Detail report (official count)	Enhancement	- Ability to filter the user's electorate's counts by the office responsible for their counts. - The purpose of this function is to enable EMs to see and conduct reasonableness checks separately on results for their electorate counted by each contributing office. - This will enable EMs to see which contributors have completed their counts and separately compare counts from similar sources (including considering only those counts conducted within their own electorate). - This will be of particular use to Māori electorates, but will also enable general electorate EMs to consider domestic and overseas votes separately.
Electorate Detail Report (Election Night and official count)	Enhancement	- Ability to sort the reports by electorate and voting place number or by the number of ballot papers issued or spoilt or disallowed, as well as by last modified time (the current sort). - The purpose of this function is to enable EMs to more easily identify near-duplicate results and anomalously high numbers of spoilt and disallowed votes. - Note: exact duplicates are identified by issues management, but results that are almost duplicates (e.g. near misses) are not. This will surface near misses.
Election Night and Official Count Comparison	Enhancement	- An issue was found during GE2023 that different thresholds were not being correctly applied within this report. - Testing and remediation will be undertaken to ensure the report functions as designed.

Results History and “Lock”

Identified issue

36. Results-sets can currently be changed in EMS without a systems-based audit trail being created.
37. Current process is that a paper-based trail supports any changes made and permissions are used to limit who can enter and adjust results data. However, where paper trails are incomplete, changes can be made with the appropriate authority (the Electorate Manager) being unaware of the change and/or the rationale for the change is not being fully recorded or understood.
38. As noted by PwC, key issues are that:
- the official count results can be directly overwritten in EMS with no ability to track changes, or reconcile back to corrections or approvals
 - EMS lacks basic audit trail functionality, with no reliable controls in place to identify changes made to results during the Official Count process, or to confirm data changes are completed as directed (e.g. that all ineligible votes are removed).

Aim and description

39. The **‘Results History’** function will provide a full history of the changes made to individual result-sets.
40. An example of the type of information this report will provide is attached at Appendix 3. The earliest action on the results set is provided at the bottom of the report and the most recent at the top, with all issues identified (e.g. systems generated ones) and whether they were resolved once a modification was made.
41. Permissions will determine who can access this information and guidance will be provided in the Operations Manual on how often it should be viewed and by whom.
42. The **‘Results Lock’** function will ensure that only authorised changes are made to a results-set, by a person with the appropriate permission.
43. Once a count is balanced and any identified issues are resolved (linking it to the previous initiative), the result will be automatically locked by the system.
44. Continuing with the new process flow described in Appendix 1, this lock will:
- Enable the voting place certificate to be printed and signed by the Electorate Manager. If the Electorate Manager finds a reason that the result needs to change, then an appropriate person will have the ability to unlock the result for the change.
 - Mean that results can only be changed by applying an extraction (see below) or by the appropriate person unlocking the count.
 - Mean that it will only be possible to print off the Final Certificate once all the counts contributing to an electorate-level certificate have been locked.
45. A paper will be provided to discuss accountabilities and the appropriate roles to complete such tasks, including reviewing the information to provide assurance.

Extraction

Identified issue

46. ‘Extraction’ refers to the process of removing a vote from the count as the vote has been deemed a dual vote or because the voter is a post-Writ change (either a ‘deletion’ or a ‘transfer’).

47. As noted above, extraction currently occurs without any basic audit trail functionality, so there are no reliable controls in place to identify changes made as a result of the extraction process.
48. This also means that it is not possible to easily obtain assurance that data changes have been completed and/or completed as directed (e.g. that all ineligible votes are removed and only ineligible votes are removed).

Aim and description

49. This initiative aims to ensure a control is in place to understand what has been changed in a results set, why it has been changed and by whom.
50. The 'Extraction' will consist of a form for recording the following information:
- Electorate, voting place and phase of the count
 - Reason for extraction (apparent dual vote, post-writ deletion or post-writ transfer)
 - Party and candidate affected.
51. Two options were considered for implementation.

Option	Pros	Cons
1. Record extractions separately and apply them to counts at point of reporting	• Provides a clear distinction between base count and post-extraction count. • Easy to "undo".	• Need to rebuild all reports to take account of changes • Changes to base count after extraction (but not related to extraction) may be done wrong.
2. Record extractions, but apply them directly to result-sets.	• Existing reports continue to work as they do currently, which makes this approach much easier to implement.	• Less clarity between base count and extracted count • Harder (marginally) to "undo" • Changes to base count after extraction (but not related to extraction) may be done wrong.

52. Option 2 was chosen to progress to design and development.
53. Option 1 was determined to be more complex to build as it affects 11 existing reports, as well as the way both results are published to the web and into the E9 results publication. While the complexity of the changes to the reports is considered relatively low, the number and criticality of them means making the changes comes with a significant analysis, design and development effort.
54. Assumptions that will be applied to the process are that:
- Extractions will only be applied once a result has had all other issues resolved and the result set has been locked.
 - It will not be possible to produce electorate-level 'Partial' and 'Final' certificates until counts affected by extractions have had their worksheets and certificates reprinted and signed off by the appropriate authority
55. The fact that the extraction has occurred will also be recorded on:
- The Official Count Worksheet; and
 - The Official Count voting place results certificate.
56. This record will consist of the ballot paper number, user who entered the extraction and reason for extraction, with a signature panel added to the worksheet. It will not include the impact of the extraction. The record will appear above the existing signature panel on the certificate. An example of how it may look is as follows:

Ballot paper [number] was extracted from the count by [username] due to [reason].

E.g. “Ballot paper 12345 was extracted from the count by Adele s9(2)(a) due to apparent dual vote.”

57. Further consideration will be given to whether sign-offs to worksheets and/or certificates should be recorded electronically. This could be when the document is printed (assuming this function is limited to the appropriate authorising authority) or could be a manual checkbox.
58. Reports will also be developed that summarise extractions at both an electorate and nationwide level. This will include an analysis of party and candidate votes extracted, to provide a control on the potential for deliberate political manipulation.
59. Finally, it is assumed that:
 - Changes made due to extractions will **not** be reflected in the issues management function, as this should mean that errors will not be made as a result of the extraction process
 - Post-Writ transfers extracted will **not** be automatically added into the Party Vote Only count (noting that this will be too difficult to achieve as the special vote count occurs once extraction is complete).

Audit Logging

60. As noted above, the PwC Internal Audit Report found that both the EMS and ERSA systems lacks basic audit trail functionality. EMS in particular was seen as having no reliable controls in place to identify changes made to results during the Official Count process or to confirm data changes are completed as directed.
61. It is noted that two of the above initiatives go some way to addressing this gap:
 - The ‘Results History’ initiative tracks changes made to specific results sets.
 - The ‘Issues Management Function’ provides an audit trail of why changes made are to specific results sets.
62. A key question discussed in the meeting on 17 December was whether the Commission wants to apply a more complete approach to audit logging in EMS. The same question was also noted for ERSA, but this will be addressed in the separate paper on this system given the end-of-life status of its front-end.
63. Those present noted that there are three options for applying audit logging to EMS, which extend from logging ‘everything’ through to targeted data changes:

Option	Pros	Cons
1. Log everything everywhere via database triggers.	Easy to implement. Comprehensive.	May result in relatively difficult to interpret logs. Relatively high (though possibly acceptable) load on the system(s).
2. Log specific (which?) tables via database triggers.	Simple but more time-consuming to implement. Lower impact on system load.	May result in relatively difficult to interpret logs. Only items we specify will be logged.
3. Log specific (which?) data via application logic.	Logs can describe changes as we like.	More effort required to design and develop. Only items we specify will be logged.

64. A key question raised was what the purpose would be for logging all database changes (e.g. this would include changes relating to non-critical data, not relevant to results capture), who would be interested in the data and how would it be used.
65. Key issues are:
- As the data desired becomes increasingly targeted, the design effort increases. The least effort would be to 'turn-on' audit logging for all changes made.
 - Logging a large amount of data could place an unacceptable load on EMS – particularly at mission critical points (e.g. Election night) – which would only be understood by making this change and seeing what happens in a test system.
66. It was agreed that the above question would be a useful one to discuss with the Strategy Team, prior to asking the Programme Board for its guidance.

Daily Certificates

Identified issue

67. *'Daily results certification' is a process required by Section 178(9) of the Electoral Act 1993 in the situation "Where at any count of the ballot papers under this section counting of the ballot papers extends beyond 1 day".*
68. *The Act continues to say that if this is the case, "the Justice attending shall give his or her certificate day by day showing the progress of that counting and describing the parcels counted in his or her presence."*
69. *Current process to meet this requirement is to print the 'Final Certificate' and manually annotate with indication that this is the daily certificate.*
70. In initial discussions held with the Legal & Policy Team, it was agreed that this does not appear to meet the specific requirements of a 'daily' certificate and that it would make sense for this to be a separate certificate with different content and triggers.

Description

71. The below outlines the content that it may make sense to include in a bespoke 'Daily Results Certificate', noting that the Act gives no further detail as to the content of the certificate than as noted above.
72. This was reached in discussion with the Legal & Policy Team, but Voting Services will formally approach the Team to confirm both the necessity of creating a new 'Daily Results Certificate' and whether inclusion of the following would be correct and complete:
- Count of counts completed previously and unchanged
 - Count of counts amended today
 - Count of counts completed today
 - Count of counts completed in total
 - Count of counts "in progress" (i.e. entered, but with outstanding issues)
 - Count of counts "not started" (i.e. not entered)
 - Total counts
 - List of counts completed today
 - List of counts amended today
 - List of counts "in progress" (i.e. entered, but with unresolved issues in the Issues Management function)

Finalising the Results

Identified issue

73. All Māori and General Electorate Managers are required to sign a 'Final Results Certificate' prior to the release of the official results.
74. All Māori and General Electorate Managers currently receive at least one 'Partial Certificate', which provides information on votes that have been counted on their behalf and which are included in the Final Certificate. These will be from:
- General Electorate Managers who have counted votes for a Māori electorate
 - The Overseas Team, which has counted votes for every electorate.
75. Little guidance is given in the Operations Manual on what checks Electorate Managers should carry out before signing off their Final Certificates.

Aim and description


76. A 'Partial Results Reconciliation report' will be developed to provide a rolled-up picture of how Overseas and Māori electorate partial results reports, and the results counted in the user's electorate directly, sum to the results in the Final Certificate.
77. The purpose of this report is to provide a simple view of all the information going into the results, which will show both EMs and nationwide officials:
- That the results that contribute to the final certificate have not been altered since they were certified.
 - Which partial result(s) have been changed in the case that the final certificate does not match the expected result based on the partial certificates.
 - The calculation summing partial to final certificates in a form that can be readily checked.
78. Further work is also underway to automate data checking within the Final Certificate. For example, to show that the total votes counted in the party votes side of the certificate matches the total of candidate + 'party vote only' votes counted.

Next steps

79. All of the above controls will be developed and tested to determine whether they are effective as designed. If required, further recommendations will be made if further changes are sought or a control needs to be accepted as it is.
80. All new and enhanced controls will also be supported with improved guidance in the Operations Manual and improved training.
81. Immediate next steps include completing a number of additional recommendation papers, most of which have been noted in this document. These papers include:
- Outlining **responsibilities and accountabilities** for the official results
 - Providing recommendations on '**Package B**', which will cover:
 - Options for bolstering controls around the count and results entry (double entry, 'fast feedback', removing the split, etc.)
 - Staffing support for the post-election period (e.g. dual votes investigations, increased quality assurance)
 - Initiatives focused on changing what occurs in a voting place, which can have a significant impact on post-election processing and timeframes
 - Providing recommendations relating to **ERSA** (control and other change initiatives, e.g. extent of audit logging, ability to search the nationwide roll and use date of birth information)

- A broader paper on **managing post-election**, which will cover:
 - Formal cut-off concepts
 - Other issues – audit logging
 - Monitoring progress
 - Managing the release of the official results to the media.

Appendix 1: Post-election – previous and new results process flow



Appendix 2: Issues management function details

A current example of the proposed 'Issues Table' is as follows:

VP#	Voting Place	E#	Electorate	Issue	Confirmed	Comment
01-012	Devonport General Store, 123 Esplanade Road	68	Tāmaki-Makaurau	Party total does not match Issued total	[(grey)]	
12-004	Epsom Events Centre, 123 Grange Road	01	Auckland Central	Party total does not match preliminary count	[]	
01-001	Appleton Estate, 123 Fake Street	01	Auckland Central	3 ballot papers issued and not returned	[X] ronald.mcdonald 2026-10-04 12:34:21	Reconciliation OK. No more found. Same in Prelim.

Appendix 3: Results History function details

A current example of the proposed 'Results History' is as follows:

Result History

Electorate: 01 Auckland Central

Voting Place Count: 24-021 Westmere School, 81 Garnet Road, Westmere (ED)

Timestamp	Action	User
20 Oct 2023 13:30:17	Extraction	Milhouse.vanHouten
20 Oct 2023 13:29:31	Extraction Deleted	Milhouse.vanHouten
20 Oct 2023 13:28:12	Extraction	Milhouse.vanHouten
16 Oct 2023 16:51:34	Locked	System
16 Oct 2023 16:51:34	Issue Resolved - (Party count for National Party does not match preliminary count)	Ned.Flanders
16 Oct 2023 14:13:43	Issue Resolved - (Party Total does not match Issued Total)	System
16 Oct 2023 14:13:43	Issue Resolved - (Candidate Total does not match Party Total)	System
16 Oct 2023 14:13:43	Modified	Lisa.Simpson
16 Oct 2023 14:12:22	Issue Identified - (Party Total does not match Issued Total)	System
16 Oct 2023 14:12:22	Issue Identified - (Candidate Total does not match Party Total)	System
16 Oct 2023 14:12:22	Issue Identified - (Party count for National Party does not match preliminary count)	System
16 Oct 2023 14:12:22	Created	Lisa.Simpson

Item: Budget Approach FY26 and FY27

To: ELT

For: ELT meeting 28 January 2025

Prepared by: Emma Gillard, Manager Finance and Administration

Recommendations

It is recommended that ELT:

- Outcome
- [REDACTED]
 - [REDACTED]
 - [REDACTED]
 - [REDACTED]
 - [REDACTED]
 - [REDACTED]
3. **agree** the indicative baseline increase as per “Scaled v2” \$319.082m
- [REDACTED]
 - [REDACTED]
 - [REDACTED]
 - [REDACTED]

Purpose

1. This paper:
- [REDACTED]
 - [REDACTED]
- b. provides high level cost breakdown based on the Board approved Scenario “Scaled v2” of the Budget Bid
- [REDACTED]
 - [REDACTED]

Background

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

Out of scope

4. Scaled v2 allows for a reduced implementation of the OAG recommendations from Scaled v1, with the same settings for election delivery as scaled v1 but reduced from the preferred option. The reduced settings from the preferred scenario are set out below and included in

Appendix A:

- a. Reduce advance voting from 12 days to 7 days
- b. Reduce community facing roles
- c. Rationalisation of voting places to remove high-cost voting places such as malls
- d. No return envelopes in enrolment update campaign for GE26 (for both MEO and the general update)
- e. Easyvote will be a card only with no additional information regarding voting places
- f. Reduce electorate headquarters to an average of 675sqm (excluding space for referendum)
- g. Reduce voting places overseas to only the ones required under legislation and for the defence force
- h. Remove kids voting.

Discussion

7. The following table shows the proposed budget for the 3-year cycle using “Scaled v2” as the indicative baseline for our budget for FY26 and FY27.

Description (\$000)	2024/25	2025/26	2026/27	Total
Baseline funding	40,258	80,774	125,895	246,927
Less: Election Access Fund (EAF)	(370)	(370)	(370)	(1,110)
Funding to be brought forward for LBE	10,618	(10,618)	-	-
Total adjusted baseline	50,506	69,786	125,525	245,817
Scaled v2 funding	1,700	31,941	48,832	82,473
Less By-election tagged contingency	(1,700)	(1,700)	(1,700)	(5,100)
Less Referendum funding	-	(7,486)	(17,932)	(25,418)
Add Revised Referendum budget	-	6,449	13,324	19,773
Scaled v2 adjusted additional funding	-	29,204	42,524	71,728
Third party revenue	317	510	710	1,537
Total indicative baseline	50,823	99,500	168,759	319,082

Out of scope

■ [REDACTED]

Appendices

A. Budget bid scenarios

■ [REDACTED]

Budget Bid Scenarios

Preferred- \$106.539m	Scaled v1- \$94.302m	Scaled v2 - \$82.474m	Scaled v3 - \$51.070m
Election service component- 44.159m	Election Service Component-34.2m	Election Service Component-34.2m	Election Service component-29m
Key facts • Total temp staff 27,872 • 75,859 voting hours • 41 votes per hour • 898 AV places • 2532 ED voting places • 392,554 issuing hours • 12 Days Advance voting • Waiting time-15min average (up to 30 + min)	Key facts (includes referendum) • Total temp staff 34,072 • 60,075 voting hours • 51 votes per hour, • 756 AV places • 2,833 ED voting places • 370,923 issuing hours • Equivalent to the 7 days of Advance voting in 2023 • Waiting time- an additional 30- 1 hour on top of preferred	Key facts (includes referendum) • Total temp staff 34,072 • 60,075 voting hours • 51 votes per hour, • 756 AV places • 2,833 ED voting places • 370,923 issuing hours • Equivalent to the 7 days of Advance voting in 2023 • Waiting time- an additional 30- 1 hour on top of preferred	Key facts (includes referendum) • Total temp staff 41,764 • 38,072 voting hours • 81 votes per hour • 414 Advance voting places • 2850 ED voting places • 309,667 issuing hours • Equivalent to 3 days advance voting • 1.5 hours average (up to 4 hours)
Full set of 'supporting services'- easyvote, face to face education	+Adds back in some services removed	+Adds back in some services removed	Some obligations cant be met in this scenario- e.g. hospitals etc
Risks in all models: 20% less advertising in the preferred so starting point is lower. Staffing was increased for population growth and SV growth in voting place but population growth only during post -election. Relies on increasing staffing levels in enrolment to compensate. Risks operational-number of temp staff required is high in all options when considered against 2023 (referendum makes it more challenging) additional votes per hour and more steps from referendum= more pressure on VP staff, more errors and greater flow on impact to Official count period. Public expectation: High congestion and crowding. Both reduced scenarios will have longer wait times than will be tolerable to many voters and reduced opportunities to vote. Final advice will consider trade- offs between investment in: • de-risking managing integrity/ time/ accuracy risks • reducing cost/ improving efficiency and building a base that can support modernisation • Service failure risk- can't recruit enough people, long lines etc.			

Table 1 - Indicative Baseline

Description (\$000)	2024/25	2025/26	2026/27	Total
Baseline funding	40,258	80,774	125,895	246,927
Less: Election Access Fund (EAF)	(370)	(370)	(370)	(1,110)
Funding to be brought forward for LBE	10,618	(10,618)	-	-
Total adjusted baseline	50,506	69,786	125,525	245,817
Scaled v2 funding	1,700	31,941	48,832	82,473
Less By-election tagged contingency	(1,700)	(1,700)	(1,700)	(5,100)
Less Referendum funding	-	(7,486)	(17,932)	(25,418)
Add Revised Referendum budget	-	6,449	13,324	19,773
Scaled v2 adjusted additional funding	-	29,204	42,524	71,728
Third party revenue	317	510	710	1,537
Total indicative baseline	50,823	99,500	168,759	319,082

PREFERRED VS SCALED SCENARIO (6 YEARS)

Summarised		Preferred	Scaled v1	Scaled v2	Scaled v3
	Inflation	114.822	114.822	114.822	114.822
	Volume	18.024	18.024	18.024	18.024
	OAG recommendations	39.424	39.424	22.964	4.758
	Modernisation	10.762	10.762	10.762	10.762
	Costs absorbed into Baseline	5.679	5.679	5.679	4.399
	Referendum costing	25.418	25.418	25.418	25.3418
Total		224.329	224.329	207.869	188.383
	<u>Reduction in Service Levels for Scaled Options:</u>				
	<i>Reduce AV from 12 to 7 days (v1 and v2) to 3 days (v3)</i>		(10,454)	(10,454)	(17,030)
	<i>Reduction in community facing roles (v1, v2) no community engagement (v3)</i>		(8,060)	(8,060)	(23,120)
	<i>Rationalisation of VPs</i>		(3,046)	(3,046)	(3,046)
	<i>No return envelopes for Enrolment update campaigns (MEO and GE)</i>		(3,148)	(3,148)	(3,148)
	<i>EasyVote – card only (v1, v2) and no EasyVote (v3)</i>		(1,839)	(1,839)	(1,839)
	<i>Reduce HQs from 709 to 675 sqm</i>		(1,567)	(1,568)	(1,568)
	<i>Reduce Overseas voting except Defence Force</i>		(0.258)	(0.258)	(0.258)
	<i>Remove kids voting</i>		(0.257)	(0.257)	(0.257)
	Total reduction in service levels for scaled options	0	(28.629)	(28.630)	(71.962)
Total		\$224.329m	\$195.700m	\$179.240m	\$116.421m
First three years		\$106.539m	\$94.302m	\$82.474m	\$51.070m

Item: Changes in enrolment operations since GE23 to strengthen data integrity and assurance

To: Executive Leadership Team

For: ELT meeting, 11 March 2025

Prepared by: Ross McPherson, Director Enrolment

Recommendations

It is recommended that ELT:

1. **note** the presentation detailing key changes being implemented by Enrolment Processing to strengthen data integrity and assurance (Appendix A)
2. **note** the next steps, including developing an Enrolment Data Integrity and Assurance Plan by 30 June 2025.

Purpose

1. The presentation updates ELT on the work undertaken by Enrolment Processing, as part of business-as-usual improvements, to strengthen data integrity and assurance since the 2023 General Election.

Background

2. Following the General Election in 2023, Enrolment Processing has been undertaking a programme of continuous improvement relating to strengthening processes and practice in relation to data integrity and assurance.
3. In July 2024, the Board was provided with an update on the integrity of the electoral roll, which included the Commission's roll integrity and assurance landscape.

Discussion

4. Since that presentation, as Kaitiaki, we felt it was important that our values were reflected in what we do and how we do it. A focus was on Aratakina through uplifting our capability and continual improvement. We also emphasised the importance of Tika and getting it right first time.
5. We have been steadily designing and executing changes with the objective of improving the roll data integrity. We have focused on four main areas:
 - a) a new internal quality assurance review process
 - b) enhanced rolls cleanses
 - c) an enhanced suite of monitoring and reporting tools
 - d) a focus on uplifting our team's capability by understanding current controls and risks.

6. We are confident that these changes are improving the integrity of the electoral roll and making it easier to detect when things have gone wrong to ensure prompt corrective action.
7. This work compliments the work being undertaken in the Data Integrity and Assurance Project and wider Commission training that is being rolled out by Strategy, Governance and Development, and new online training models being developed by the Business Enablement team.

Next steps

8. We are developing an Enrolment Data Integrity and Assurance Plan that will be in place by 30 June 2025.
9. We will include updates on progress in the Enrolment quarterly report to ELT.

Appendix

A: Changes in enrolment operations since GE23 to strengthen data integrity and assurance

CHANGES IN ENROLMENT OPERATIONS SINCE GE23 TO STRENGTHEN DATA INTEGRITY AND ASSURANCE

Ross McPherson


Prepared by Daphne s9(2)(a)

March 2025

MAIN OPERATIONAL SHIFTS

From

Towards



CHANGE DRIVERS

Our objective of this work is to improve the roll data integrity, driven by the recommendations documented in the OaG and PwC reviews. The Advisor – Enrolment Integrity has been tracking the changes against the set of recommendations, with particular focus being given to PWC finding EE2 (Enhance Quality Assurance). Note: This work complements the work undertaken in the Enrolment Workstream.

General Election 2023: Independent review of counting errors
CONTROLLER—AUDITOR-GENERAL
Te Kaitiaki Take Kōwhiri

Electoral Commission
Internal Audit Report
August 2024
DRAFT
This document contains our draft, initial findings, and as such are subject to amendment or withdrawal. Our definitive findings will be those contained within the final report.
pwc

Detailed findings
FINDING EE2 (ENHANCE QUALITY ASSURANCE)
Embedded quality assurance controls are missing or not fully effective for key risk areas, meaning processing delays or errors impacting the completeness, accuracy, validity and security of the Roll may not be identified and corrected

What did we see?
Beyond the gaps in the TSR process around data entry and elector data changes (see Finding EE2), the Commission does not have sufficient controls in place to consistently identify and prevent errors in the electoral roll, as:

- Dashboards are used to monitor processing, however we note that for a quality assurance control this is not fully effective as:
 - The dashboard does not include the biggest queue (DET)
 - Data for monitoring is not real-time
 - Evidence of dashboard monitoring is not available to provide confidence to senior stakeholders that it has been completed, and issues have been resolved.
- There are no procedures in place to confirm the roll cleanses have been performed as expected, and all exceptions fully addressed.
- There are no controls in place to monitor and confirm that no one has accessed or changed restricted data outside of expected processes, and that access remains restricted to only those who have an appropriate business need. No mechanism exists to confirm IT service providers have made only approved changes to the underlying Roll data
- There are no documented controls to guide the Commission on how to manage reputational impact to the Commission if errors and inaccuracies are found in the Electoral Roll, i.e. to mitigate and reduce the impact should the risk occur
- There are no documented controls to guide the Commission on how to manage any loss in public confidence to vote and the outcome of elections, if errors and inaccuracies are found in the Electoral Roll, i.e. to mitigate and reduce the impact should the risk occur.

Where to next?
Define and introduce additional quality assurance controls, to:

1. Improve dashboards to ensure all queues are included, and data is as up-to-date as possible. If dashboards are not within the MIKE system, ensure controls are in place to validate data remains complete, accurate, valid and up-to-date
2. Identify key control activity around processing monitoring and management, and retain evidence of operation to provide Senior Management confidence that monitoring is occurring as expected, and that issues are being resolved
3. Review roll cleanses scope and see if there are further risks that are not managed by existing scope that could be addressed by a roll cleanse or new audit process
4. Introduce a control to monitor and report on roll cleanses, including confirmation that all expected activities have occurred, including resolution of any errors
5. Introduce control mechanisms to restrict access to underlying Roll data, and report on any direct changes made by Commission staff or IT service providers. Routinely monitor who has access to underlying data, and confirm all direct access relates to an approved change or incident
6. Define a "playbook" to manage undesirable outcomes if errors are found in the Electoral Roll, including reputation impact or loss of public confidence. These should be well understood, periodically tested, and used to support management of potential incidents.


Management comment: [TBC]
Owner: [TBC]
Date: [TBC]

Why is this important?
Without strong quality assurance processes in place, expected controls and outcomes may not occur, with limited ability for the Commission to identify, respond and correct any errors or delays.

PWC | Electoral Commission - Internal Audit Report 28

Focus Area – EE2 (Enhance Quality Assurance)

KEY CHANGE 1: INTERNAL QUALITY ASSURANCE REVIEW PROCESS



Benefits

- Reduced error rates as Enrolment processing staff know their work being reviewed and will receive regular feedback.
- Able to identify quality trends early and implement treatment(s).
- Provides assurance that internal reviews are being completed and to the standard required.

Recommendations that this work contributes to?

- EE2 – Recommended Next Action 2 and 6

KEY CHANGE 2: ENHANCED ROLL CLEANSES

Opportunities Identified

- Changing business rules to move controls from detective to preventative
- Move to automated dashboarding to monitor workflow and completion of checks
- Investigate what risks are not being managed by existing checks
- Strengthened feedback loop

What is being executed

- **New Person Roll Cleansing Dashboard** (semi-automated)
- **11 business rules changes piloted**, based on using additional pieces of client information to informed what needs to be checked.
- Senior Electoral Officers undertaking **cause and effect thinking** around why it was not picked up earlier..

Benefits

- Wider scope provides a large pool of check
- Using non mandatory fields (phone and email)
- Able to provided recommendations for preventative duplication checking/ changes to business rules
- Reducing enrolment anomalies requiring correction.

Potential further roll cleanse opportunities

- We are considering how to further identify the following risks:
- Overwritten electors (as opposed to merged electors)
 - Change recorded to Yes/No to Māori descent
 - Placed on wrong roll type.
 - Undeliverable addresses without postal address

What are the trends/results so far

- The new roll cleanses is more effective than the current set. We continue to investigate whether they should be replaced.
- The new set of roll cleanses has identified issues not previously known. They have been corrected.
- The impact means that progressively we are having to do fewer checks, which reflects an improved level of data integrity.

Recommendations that this work contributes to?

- EE2 – Recommended Next Action 2, 3 and 4

Next Step: New semi-automated dashboard – Phase 2: Addresses and exploring additional roll cleanse pilots.

KEY CHANGE 3: ENHANCED SUITE OF MONITORING AND REPORTING

Name	Type	Providing assurance of...	New/ Refreshed	Audience	Escalation
Internal Quality Assurance Review	Dashboard	Measures Accuracy and Validity and identifies potential impacts of error	New (Under Development – due March 25)	Team Lead, SEO	Advisor (Enrolment Integrity)
Person Roll Cleanse	Dashboard	Identifies number of person anomalies, checks and corrections.	New	Team Lead, SEO	Advisor (Enrolment Integrity)
Management Update	Report	- Quality Assurance task have been undertaken, any anomalies or risks highlighted and corrected. - Complaints and enquiries data and information.	Refreshed	Director/ ELT/Board	Director
Address roll Cleanses	Dashboard	Identifies number of address anomalies, checks and corrections.	New (Under Development – due April 25)	Team Lead, SEO	Advisor (Enrolment Integrity)
Monitoring and Review of MIKE Reports	Spreadsheet	Provides singles view of information on accuracy of dwelling names, postal addresses, unallocated meshblocks etc.	New	Team Lead, SEO	Advisor (Enrolment Integrity)
Keying authorities and Electorate scopes	Report	Ensure that the right people have access to MIKE and only have access needed for their role.	New	Advisor (Enrolment Integrity)	Team Leaders/Director


Benefits

- Understanding type of errors being made
- Identify training gaps and who needs extra support
- Ability to break down errors by processing site or keyer
- Able to focus on consistency of processes and training outcomes

Recommendations that this work contributes to?

- EE2 - Recommended Next Action 1 and 5

KEY CHANGE 4: PEOPLE CAPABILITY UPLIFT



NEXT STEPS

We are developing an Enrolment Data Integrity, and Assurance Plan, which will include:

- Finalising Enrolment Assurance reporting, including schedule of assurance activities, and escalation pathways.
- Formalising a new Internal Quarterly Management Audit.
- Finalising a Quality Assurance Plan across the full Enrolment Ecosystem.
- Heatmapping the *Enrolment Roll Integrity and Assurance Landscape* to identify focus areas for further improvements.
- Enhancing the quarterly reporting to ELT and the Board.
- Providing oversight around how we are executing changes relating to the OaG and PwC recommendations.
- Driving further activity to drive capability uplift around data integrity and assurance.

The plan will be developed by 30 June 2025 and will be led by Daphne s9(2)(a) – Advisor (Enrolment Integrity). This work will compliment and run parallel to the Data Integrity and Assurance work undertaken in the GE26 Enrolment Workstream.

Guidance and support will be provided by both the Data Integrity and Assurance Project, Strategy, Risk and Assurance team, and the recently appointed Senior Analyst – Operations Risk and Assurance.