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DEPARTMENT OF THE
PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET
TE TARI O TE PIRIMIA ME TE KOMITI MATUA



Protocol on the management of election disruptions

August 2026

Protocol on the management of election disruptions

Introduction

1. A variety of hazards and threats, such as a natural disaster, adverse weather conditions, riot or disorder, or act of terrorism or cyber incident, could cause “unforeseen or unavoidable disruptions”¹ to the 2026 General Election at the local, regional and/or national levels.
2. This protocol outlines the government approach for mitigating and managing hazards and threats that may cause unforeseen or unavoidable disruptions (hereafter referred to as “disruptive events”) that impact the 2026 General Election in the context of New Zealand’s existing emergency management and strategic crisis management arrangements. Specifically, it describes:
 - The Electoral Commission’s arrangements for planning and governance for readiness and risk reduction prior to the election period;²
 - how government agencies will liaise and coordinate with the Chief Electoral Officer and the Electoral Commission in the run up to, and during, the election period;
 - how the Electoral Commission and agencies will work together to enable all-of-government coordination during the campaign period until the formation of a government if the integrity, safety or security of the electoral process is threatened or disrupted at the national, regional, or local level; and
 - the range of mechanisms available to the Chief Electoral Officer to manage the impact any disruptive event may have on the electoral process.

Planning and governance for managing election disruptions prior to the election period

3. The Electoral Commission has established governance arrangements to support inter-agency preparedness for possible disruption during the 2026 General Election. Two key bodies under these arrangements, the Senior Officials Committee and Risk and the Security Working Group, will undertake readiness and risk-reduction tasks **in the lead-up** to the election period.
4. These governance bodies are integrated into the governance structure of the National Resilience System. The chairs of both bodies report into National Resilience System governance at appropriate levels (as noted further below).

Senior Officials Committee for the 2026 General Election

5. The Senior Officials Committee provides advice on risk planning (from an elections perspective) for responses to disruptive events that may impact the General Election.
6. This Committee, chaired by the Chief Electoral Officer as Chief Executive of the Electoral

¹ The definition of “unforeseen and unavoidable disruption” is provided in section 195 of the Electoral Act 1993.

² For the purposes of this document, the election period is from 21 October 2026 when Overseas and Dictation voting starts through to the declaration of official results.

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Commission, includes representatives from the Ministry of Justice, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC), National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB), New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS), Te Puni Kōkiri, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), the Department of Internal Affairs (DIA) and New Zealand Police.

7. For the purposes of preparing for disruptive events, the Committee advises the Chief Electoral Officer.
8. The Committee ensures the Commission and government agencies are clear on their individual and shared responsibilities for the management of, and response to, disruptive events. More specifically the Committee:
 - oversees risks that could disrupt the 2026 General Election and provides guidance or direction as appropriate to the Risk and Security Working Group (whose purpose and function are set out below) on the management of these risks;
 - ensures effective planning, coordination and collaboration is occurring, including work directly considering the management of the full range of potential disruptive events; and
 - provides advice to the Chief Electoral Officer on issues to be raised to the National Security Board or other National Resilience System governance fora, or separately with agency Chief Executives.

The Risk and Security Working Group

9. This Working Group, chaired by the Deputy Chief Electoral Officer, includes representatives from agencies on the Senior Officials Committee and wider agency representatives to reflect the 'all hazards, all-threats' focus of the group. For the purposes of risk reduction and preparing for disruptive events, the Working Group works closely with the Major Events Security Committee (MESCC), a sub-committee of the National Security Board (NSB).
10. The Deputy Chief Electoral Officer leads the development of an inter-agency risk management approach through the Working Group. The Working Group assists in identifying external risks and threats to the election and possible mitigations. The Deputy Chief Electoral Officer seeks guidance from the Working Group on how to best work with lead agencies to ensure these risks are managed and mitigated. The risks, mitigations, and management actions are recorded in a risk profile that is updated as required and provided to the Senior Officials Committee to inform forward planning and the Ministry of Justice-hosted coordination group once it is stood up.
11. The Working Group:
 - keeps the Senior Officials Committee, other required agencies/entities informed of the risk profile and inter-agency preparedness for the election, and where relevant, the wider ODESC System;
 - provides advice to support the Electoral Commission's development of risk treatment plans to enable coordinated responses to potential events, together with the Lead Agency responsible for that particular hazard/risk at local, regional and national levels; and
 - supports scenario testing of these risk treatment plans to evaluate the level of readiness to

respond to disruptive events and ability of the electoral process to recover.

- establishes clear thresholds and decision points to identify when an event may threaten to disrupt the electoral process, and what steps to then take, as a core part of the Electoral Commission's contingency planning.

New Zealand's strategic crisis and emergency management arrangements (management of disruptive events during the election period)

12. New Zealand uses a lead agency model for responding to emergencies and crisis events for events arising from hazards and threats. This is based on the principle that incidents, emergencies and crises will be handled first at the lowest level possible, escalating when needed. In many cases, incidents can be managed within the resources of a single department, or at a local level. The current list of pre-assigned lead agencies is provided at [Annex A](#).
13. If situations or emergencies meet the threshold for strategic-level coordination, these will be escalated into the Officials' Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (the ODESC system), which provides strategic crisis management, coordination.³
14. As with any national-level events that involve national security risks, the safety and security of the 2026 General Election is dependent on a range of government agencies serving as lead agencies to manage the risks arising. This model will be used for managing disruptive events
15. The ODESC system crisis management arrangements may be activated to support central government agencies to work together at the local, regional, and national levels to ensure that any Government-led response to a disruptive event considers the need to preserve the integrity of the New Zealand electoral process as best it can.
16. The expectation for the 2026 General Election is that all agencies and the existing national, regional, and regional/local emergency management system and structures will continue to use established processes and procedures when planning for, and responding to, disruptive events. However, business as usual processes and procedures may also need to be modified to apply in ways that reflect that New Zealand is running a major national event, and one with constitutional significance.
17. More specifically, for emerging risks or a disruptive event occurring at local, regional, or national level that impact the 2026 General Election:
 - the lead agency responsible for the specific hazard/risk as per standing ODESC system arrangements holds the responsibility for managing the response to the event and its non-electoral impacts; and
 - the key decision-making powers for maintaining the integrity and conduct of elections are vested in the Chief Electoral Officer (and are further outlined at paragraphs 38– 69).
18. In practice, this will mean that if a response is required to manage a disruptive event, and either the event itself or the response to it disrupts the 2026 General Election, agencies must give due consideration to minimising any further disruption to the General Election. Agencies should

³ [New Zealand's strategic crisis response arrangements | Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet \(DPMC\)](#)

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account for this requirement in their planning, and when coordinating their response (whether or not it requires formal activation of the ODESC system) and should seek to escalate any concerns through the standard ODESC system escalation process (outlined in more detail below).

19. More information on the arrangements that are relevant for managing risks related to the 2026 General Election can be found here:
 - [Sections 195 to 195E of the Electoral Act 1993](#): the Act sets out powers for responding to an unforeseen or unavoidable disruption that is likely to prevent voters voting at a voting place or pose a risk to the proper conduct of an election. [Sections 171C to 171E](#) also apply for the advance polling period.
 - The [Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002](#): the CDEM Act creates the framework within which New Zealand can prepare for, respond to, and recover from local, regional and national emergencies. This Act defines the functions and responsibilities of government departments, local government agencies, emergency services and lifeline utilities within the framework.⁴
 - The [National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan](#), which:
 - a. provides a framework to which all other emergency management plans must align;
 - b. outlines arrangements for the coordination of emergency management activities during emergency; and
 - c. describes the roles and responsibilities of government agencies and Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups before, during and after emergencies.
 - [The National Resilience System Handbook](#): this describes the conditions in which the Government should activate the ODESC system in a response to a crisis. This covers the thresholds for events that are nationally significant or complex enough to demand a coordinated strategic approach at the national level. The Handbook contains guidance about:
 - a. The role and function of the ODESC system in response to a potential, emerging or actual event;
 - b. The responsibilities of lead agencies;
 - c. The escalation pathway; and
 - d. Governance and decision-making for crisis events, including the different types of meetings that may be held.
20. A variety of plans and guides that provide further detail for responses to specific events supplement these emergency management and strategic crisis arrangements.

Escalation into the ODESC system

21. During the election period (as during business as usual), lead agencies will be expected to follow standard escalation processes to the ODESC system during the election period, to raise any concerns about emerging hazards and national security risks/events as described in the National

⁴ The Emergency Management Act 2026 is moving through Parliament to replace The CDEM Act.

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Resilience System Handbook. The triggers used to consider whether ODESC system coordination is required are:

- There are unusual features of scale, nature, intensity or consequence.
 - Conveys significant challenges for sovereignty or nationwide law and order.
 - Suggests multiple or inter-related problems – creating national or systemic risk.
 - Involves a high degree of uncertainty or complexity.
 - Is beyond the ability of one lead agency to manage.
 - There is no pre-defined lead agency.
 - Concurrency of events (impacting system resources).
 - Is an emerging issue that might meet the above criteria in the future, and would benefit from proactive management.
22. More specifically, before or during the election period there may be disruptive events or responses that a lead agency or another organisation believes could potentially impact the 2026 General Election. This includes if the Chief Electoral Officer believes a threat/risk to the 2026 General Election exists.
23. In the first instance, the lead agency should contact the Electoral Commission and DPMC to discuss the risk/event. If warranted, the ODESC system will be activated by the Chief Executive DPMC in their capacity as the Chair of ODESC.
24. The ODESC system does not have to be formally activated for agencies to coordinate a response to an issue. In some cases, an Inter-Agency Working Group will be sufficient to manage the issue. This can, but does not necessarily, escalate to an activation of the ODESC system, which is formally activated when a Watch Group or an ODESC meeting is convened, or an email declaring an activation has occurred is sent to Chief Executives.
25. If an ODESC system meeting is convened, electoral matters will be considered alongside issues to do with the response itself. ODESC members will:
- discuss the nature, scale, and duration of the disruptive event and the planned response in relation to risks and implications to the election;
 - ensure that relevant information is made available for the Chief Electoral Officer to consider prior to their taking decisions on election conduct as required under the Electoral Act;
 - seek advice from the Chief Electoral Officer on how he intends to manage election conduct following the disruptive event, within the bounds of the Electoral Act; and
 - seek assurance that in response to an event, officials will consider the need to minimise the threat of disruption to the election process itself.
26. Where a disruptive event is identified as likely to cause material disruption to the 2026 General Election, the Chief Electoral Officer will report into ODESC as both Chief Executive of the Electoral Commission, and due to the decision-making powers vested in him under sections

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[171C](#), [195A](#), [195B](#) and [195D](#) of the Electoral Act 1993 for maintaining the integrity and conduct of elections, as the Chief Electoral Officer.

27. If there are other activations of the ODESC system that appear to have the potential to impact the 2026 General Election process, DPMC will advise the Electoral Commission of the event.

Information coordination

28. The Electoral Commission and government agencies are expected to proactively share information that could have a bearing on the successful conduct of the election, particularly with regard to potential disruptions.
29. In the lead up to the campaign period, the primary channels for sharing information will be through the Senior Officials Committee and the Risk and Security Working Group. Senior Electoral Commission staff may also brief established governance bodies, including the Major Events Security Committee and the National Security Board.
30. In the lead up to and during the 2026 General Election, a dedicated coordination group will be established to facilitate interagency coordination. This will be hosted by the Ministry of Justice, as part of its role as a steward for the electoral system.
- The coordination will coordinate across existing agency mandates to identify cross-agency risks, triage issues, coordinate information flows, and provide strategic oversight of threats to public trust and confidence in the election.
 - Election-related information and reporting should be referred into the Coordination Group by agencies and the NZ Police-led Joint Intelligence Group (JIG). Input will be reviewed by the Coordination Group, who will ensure wider agency situational awareness. Where appropriate, the Coordination Group will refer issues to agencies for consideration of further engagement or action, in line with the lead agency model. Following a referral, agencies may choose to undertake policy, operational and/or communications measures, keeping the Coordination Group informed of progress.
 - Issues requiring strategic system oversight, risk management, coordination and/or governance will be escalated to the ODESC system via DPMC, using existing thresholds for the ODESC system.
31. Practically, if agencies hold specific information that could give rise to disruptive events, this should be reported simultaneously into the Coordination Group and into DPMC's Strategic Crisis Management Directorate (SCMD). For example, if Te Whatu Ora (Health New Zealand) becomes aware of cases of a highly transmissible communicable disease, or if New Zealand Police become aware of threats of violence by an individual or group against voters, SCMD should be notified as per business as usual, but the Coordination Group should be informed as well. The two will work together to establish whether the issue can be managed by the lead agency or requires escalation. Outside of these bodies, information can also be exchanged on a business-as-usual basis between the Electoral Commission and government agencies electronically with the appropriate classification markings on the secure Government Email system up to the 'In Confidence' level.⁵

⁵ The Electoral Commission's SEEMAIL system is currently limited to the 'In Confidence' level.

The role of the Chief Electoral Officer and Electoral Commission

32. The Electoral Commission is responsible for the operational delivery of the 2026 General Election. The Chief Electoral Officer, as Chief Executive of the Electoral Commission, seeks to ensure the Commission acts independently in performing its statutory functions and duties.
33. The Electoral Commission must take all reasonable steps in its planning to ensure the safety and security of the public and staff while voting.
34. The Electoral Commission will ensure this responsibility is fulfilled through:
 - maintaining oversight of all hazards and threats that may threaten to disrupt the General Election and awareness of the mitigations and other management actions Lead Agencies may use to address these;
 - ensuring that the security workstream conducted as part of the Commission's internal work programme for the 2026 General Election is resourced and empowered to address any risks or threats identified;
 - promoting among permanent and temporary field staff a culture of security awareness;
 - developing a strategic approach to communications (across local, regional and national levels and, where appropriate, for offshore with MFAT), with pre-emptive material that can be immediately leveraged to respond to a disruptive event.
35. With regard to the provisions of the Electoral Act for responding to electoral disruptions, the Chief Electoral Officer is empowered under the Act to respond to the disruptive event.
36. Should the Chief Electoral Officer not be available, he may delegate these powers to the Deputy Chief Electoral Officer.⁶

Local/ regional coordination, planning and response

37. Pre-planning requirements extend to the Commission's field staff. This includes Regional Managers across both the Commission's Enrolment and Community Engagement team and the Voting Services team, supported by Registrars of Electors and Electorate Managers around the country.
38. The Electoral Commission will ensure that business continuity and disaster recovery plans are developed for the election period that consider the requirements of field staff at the local/regional level. These plans will be reviewed to ensure that they align with the [National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan 2015](#) and other existing government agency (and other organisations) emergency management plans for their region.
39. Each Regional Manager must maintain key points of contact at the local and regional levels for:
 - New Zealand Police

⁶ The Deputy Chief Electoral Officer is authorised to exercise all the Chief Electoral Officer's powers in his absence and holds a formal delegation.

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- Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups
 - Fire and Emergency New Zealand
 - Te Whatu Ora (Health New Zealand)
 - Ambulance
 - New Zealand Transport Authority
 - Te Puni Kokiri
 - key national level contacts at the Electoral Commission National Office and NEMA, and
 - other local level officers as required.
40. The Chief Electoral Officer requires Regional Managers to notify both the relevant local authorities and the Electoral Commission National Office if they become aware of a disruptive event which they believe is threatening/may threaten the conduct of the electoral process.
41. In the case of an event that may/is threatening lives, welfare or property, Regional Managers (from both the Enrolment and Community Engagement and Voting Services staff) will liaise with local Civil Defence Emergency Management Managers and/or relevant Lead Agency points of contact to determine whether the event or response to the event may also disrupt the electoral process in their area. Regional Managers will then inform the Electoral Commission's National Office (at Director level) of the event.⁷ If required, the Electoral Commission will ensure that the appropriate national level authorities are aware of the situation.
42. In the case of an imminent threat to lives, welfare or property, any agency official will notify the New Zealand Police immediately through the 111 number.
43. New Zealand Police are responsible for responding to and investigating election-related offending. Police activity during the election period focuses on maintaining law and order, facilitating lawful democratic participation, and responding to unlawful activity in a proportionate and politically neutral manner.
- A senior investigator is appointed in each policing District as an Election-Related Offending (ERO) Liaison Officer. These officers act as the primary point of contact between Districts and the National Criminal Investigation Group (NCIG).
 - All complaints and investigations relating to election-related offending are referred to, coordinated and monitored centrally through the Director of NCIG to ensure national consistency, proportionality, and appropriate escalation where required. Districts remain responsible for progressing investigations in accordance with this national coordination.
 - Threats to MPs, candidates, and political party leaders during the election period are monitored, but they are only considered election-related crimes if there is a clear link to the election and they meet the criminal threshold.

⁷ The Electoral Commission has a National Manager Voting Services and National Manager Enrolment and Community Engagement.

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Disruptive events on election day

44. Should a disruptive event impact voting on election day, the Chief Electoral Officer can exercise powers under sections [195A](#) or [195B](#) of the Electoral Act 1993 to adjourn voting at one or more voting places or provide alternative voting processes to manage the disruptive event.
45. The Chief Electoral Officer may modify or adapt any requirements, processes or procedures under the Electoral Act in order to invoke “alternative voting processes” which may include (but are not limited to):
 - revoking and amending a particular voting place (or places);
 - extending and/or modifying the voting hours at voting places;
 - modifying any other requirements or procedures set out in the Act;
 - making voting by telephone dictation available to affected voters; or
 - extending to voters in New Zealand the procedure for the electronic issue of voting papers that is available to voters outside New Zealand.
46. In considering whether to exercise his powers under sections [195A](#) or [195B](#) and in what form, the Electoral Act requires the Chief Electoral Officer to have regard to the following matters:
 - the need to ensure the safety of voters and electoral officials; and
 - the need to ensure that the election process is free from corrupt or illegal practices; and
 - the need to ensure that the election process is concluded in a timely and expeditious manner.
47. If the Chief Electoral Officer decides, based on the best available advice, that activating the emergency provisions is necessary, having had regard to these factors, he will exercise his powers under the Act.
48. If the disruptive event and area affected is localised, the Chief Electoral Officer will first assess alternate arrangements for voters rather than adjourn. This is due to the impact upon conduct of the election of any adjournment decision. Under the Act, if voting is adjourned in even a single voting place, the election of all Members of Parliament and, therefore, the formation of Government is delayed for the period of the adjournment.
49. When considering alternative voting process options:
 - If voters can reasonably access another voting place, the Chief Electoral Officer may revoke the particular voting place(s) and continue with the conduct of the General Election in the rest of the affected electorate and nationwide.
 - If the voters cannot get to another voting place, the Chief Electoral Officer will assess whether alternative processes such as dictation voting, or the electronic issue of voting papers is practicable.
50. Among these options, the Chief Electoral Officer will preferentially choose to revoke and amend a particular voting place(s) or extend and/or modify voting hours. While the Electoral Commission considers in pre-planning the practicality of the options of extending dictation

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voting and the electronic issue of voting papers, the limited scalability of these services limits use of these options to localised areas with limited voting numbers.

51. If the disruptive event has or is likely to have wider effect, or the alternative voting process options are otherwise not practicable, the Chief Electoral Officer may adjourn voting in particular voting places and continue with voting elsewhere in the country.⁸
52. The Chief Electoral Officer may choose to adjourn voting at a voting place for an initial period of no more than three days. Following this, voting at the voting place can be adjourned for one or multiple periods of no more than seven days each, for as long as the disruptive event prevents voting taking place.
53. A flow chart illustrating the Chief Electoral Officer's decision-making and notification processes is attached as [Annex C](#).

Disruptive events at advance voting places or during the advance voting period

54. In the case of an event which materially disrupts voting at one or more advance voting places or meaningfully affects an advance voting place (e.g. a cyber incident that brought down the Electoral Commission's electronic systems, or an epidemic), the Chief Electoral Officer cannot adjourn advance voting. However, under section 171C of the [Electoral Act 1993](#), the Chief Electoral Officer may shorten or extend the advance voting period if the disruptive event occurs before the start of the advance voting period, although it cannot extend beyond polling day. The Chief Electoral Officer may also use the previously mentioned alternative voting processes under 195B if the disruptive event may reasonably be expected to continue until election day.⁹
55. The Chief Electoral Officer would consider the same matters when exercising his discretion on disruptive events at advance voting places as prescribed for disruptive events at voting places on election day. He must have regard to:
 - the need to ensure the safety of voters and electoral officials; and
 - the need to ensure that the election process is free from corrupt or illegal practices; and
 - the need to ensure that the election process is concluded in a timely and expeditious manner.¹⁰
56. If the Chief Electoral Officer decides that exercising the emergency powers is necessary, having had regard to these factors, he will in the first instance look to amend voting places or modify voting at advance voting places. If this does not suitably address access for voters to advance voting places, the Chief Electoral Officer will assess whether dictation voting, or the electronic issue of voting papers is practicable.
57. Before making any changes to the duration or timing of advance voting under section 171C, the Chief Electoral Officer must consult with the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, and other relevant parties.¹¹ Public notice of any changes to the duration or timing of advance voting

⁸ Before adjourning, the CEO must also consult the PM and Opposition leader, and experts Section 195A(3), Electoral Act 1993

⁹ [Section 195B\(1\)\(a\)](#), Electoral Act 1993.

¹⁰ [Section 195C](#), Electoral Act 1993.

¹¹ Consultation only required if the voting period will no longer be 12 days

must also be given.

Deferral of release of information about preliminary results

58. The Chief Electoral Officer must defer the release of the preliminary vote count where a disruptive event delays the close of voting, as required under the [Electoral Act 1993](#).¹²
59. However, the Chief Electoral Officer may disclose the preliminary result information if he considers that the disclosure of the information will not unduly influence the overall result of the poll in an electoral district, the number of seats in Parliament that a party is entitled to be allocated, and selection of list members.

Public notification of a disruptive event and response

60. The Chief Electoral Officer will be the key spokesperson to address conduct issues relating to the 2026 General Election. In this role, the Chief Electoral Officer must inform members of the public of any adjournment or alternate arrangements that it has been decided will be set up as a result of the disruptive event, either during the advance voting period or on election day.
61. Comment on the nature of the disruptive event and its other consequences will be reserved for the lead agency responding to the event, or for the event spokesperson as determined by the lead agency.
62. Because of the need for immediacy, public notification of changes to voting places would be by local radio or other media operating in areas impacted by the disruptive event(s). Depending on the circumstances, notices would also be put up in the impacted area(s) around any revoked voting places letting voters know where else they can go to vote. The Chief Electoral Officer would also notify all party secretaries.

Continuity of Government

63. In the event of any voting place being adjourned on election day, the return of the writ will be delayed by the same number of days as this delay. The formation of Government will therefore be delayed for the same amount of time. Under the [Electoral Act 1993](#), Members of Parliament cease to be members at the close of voting day. Further, as any adjournment prevents the successful electorate candidate being declared elected, this would prevent the Electoral Commission declaring a final nationwide party result and allocating list seats.
64. The Executive can continue for a defined period following the election under current legislation. A Minister of the Crown or member of the Executive Council can continue to act in that capacity for 28 days after he or she ceases to be a Member of Parliament.¹³ In addition, a person who is not a Member of Parliament but has been a candidate for election, may be appointed a minister or member of the Executive Council for a period of up to forty days from the date of appointment (but must vacate office if they do not become an MP in that time).¹⁴

¹² [Section 195D](#), Electoral Act 1993. Note that this does apply to Special Votes not counted on election night, which includes overseas votes.

¹³ [Section 6\(2\)\(b\)](#), Constitution Act 1986 provides that Ministers of the Crown and members of the Executive Council continue to act in that capacity until the close of the day after the day on which the Electoral Commission declares the elected list candidates under section 195(5)(a) of the Electoral Act 1993.

¹⁴ [Section 6\(2\)\(a\)](#), Constitution Act 1986.



Ben King
Chair of ODESC
Chief Executive, Department of the
Prime Minister and Cabinet



Karl Le Quesne
Chief Electoral Officer




Andrew Kibblewhite
Secretary for Justice

Annex A: Lead agencies

These are the current allocations of Lead Agencies, at time of publication

Emergency or crisis event	LEAD AGENCY
Major cyber incident	Affected agency/ies or entity/ies, supported by the National Cyber Security Centre
Wildfire	Fire and Emergency New Zealand (FENZ)
Urban fire	
Hazardous substance incidents	
Major maritime safety incident	Maritime New Zealand (MNZ)
Marine oil spill	
Mass arrival	Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE)
Major Transport incident	Ministry for Cities, Environment, Regions and Transport (MCERT)
Offshore humanitarian response	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT)
Hostage taking overseas	
Armed conflict overseas (i.e. Russia-Ukraine, Israel-Gaza)	
Antarctica Incident	
Infectious human disease outbreak (including pandemic)	Ministry of Health (MoH)
Radiation incident	
Drought	Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI)
Pest and disease incursion	
Food safety incident	National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA)
Geological (earthquake, volcanic hazards, landslide, tsunami)	
Meteorological (coastal hazards, coastal erosion, large swells, flooding, severe winds, storm surges, heavy snow)	
Infrastructure failure	
Terrorist attack (domestic)	New Zealand Police
Violent protest or public disorder event	
Espionage	New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS)

Annex B: Activated structure for responding to a disruption to the election



Annex C: Process for managing election disruption under the Electoral Act 1993

